Indiana Law Journal
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 4

Winter 1945

Tort Liability of a Soldier or Subordinate Officer Acting in
Obedience of Orders
J.D. Mann
United States Army

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Mann, J.D. (1945) "Tort Liability of a Soldier or Subordinate Officer Acting in Obedience of Orders," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 20 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol20/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

THE TORT LIABILITY OF A SOLDIER OR SUBORDINATE
OFFICER ACTING IN OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS
J. D. MANN*
"I, John Doe, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the United States of America; that I will serve them
honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever; and
that I will obey the President of the United States and the orders
of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and Articles
of War. So help me Godl' '

With these words many an American has stepped out
of his quiet, unobtrusive life as a civilian into a str(ange, new
world. He has become a part of a great organizationthe armed forces of the United States.
Having taken the oath "to obey the President of the
United States and the orders of the officers appointed over"
him, and yet believing that what he is told to do would subject him to liability in the civil courts, what is to be his
guide? How can he cope with the dilemma confronting him?
The English courts have stated that a soldier does not,
by making himself a member of the regular forces, thereby
cease to be a citizen, so as to deprive him of his rights or
exempt him from his liabilities under the law.2 He does,
however, incur additional responsibilities-being at all times
and under all circumstances subject to a code of military
law contained in the Army Act, the King's Regulations, and
Army Orders. 3 The rule is similar in the United States.
The citizen on becoming a soldier does not merge his former
character in the latter. He releases himself from none of his former
duties and obligations. Instead of this he engages to perform other
duties in addition to those with which he was formerly charged. He
submits himself to a special code of laws, which does rot supersede
or abrogate that to which he was formerly subject, but which, on the
contrary, binds him by a new tie to the very same authority, which,
as a citizen he previously obeyed. With regard to the civil powers
and authorities, he stands in precisely the same position he formerly
*
1.

Lieutenant, Infantry, AUS.
The oath of a soldier upon being inducted into the Army of the
United States.
2. Burdett v Abbot, 4 Taunt. 401, 128 Eng. Rep. (C.P.) 384 (1812.)
3. English Army Act, §§ 175 and 176; King's Regulations, pars.
512-629 (1935); but cf. English relationships between military
and civil offenses tried by military courts; appeals; etc., English
Army Act, § 41; Manual of Military Law, c. 8, par. 2; Crown
Practice, Vol. IX, p. 701 ff.
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occupied. There is no principle more thoroughly incorporated in
our military as well as in our civil code, than that the soldier does
not cease to be a citizen and cannot throw off his obligations and
responsibilities as such. 4

Although this is clearly the majority rule, it has been
sharply criticized.
A man who becomes a judge or a legislator is likewise none the
less a citizen, yet he enjoys immunity for certain wrongs done in the
course of his official duties which are only lawful because the public
service demands that there should be no legal responsibility in such
instances.
Are not the demands of the public service great enough to entitle
the soldier and militiaman to absolute immunity from civil and criminal
responsibility for acts done in obedience to the orders of a superior
officer? One court at least, appears to have thought so. To so protect the soldier would not leave the injured party without remedy,
for, as has already been said, he may still have a right of action
against the officer who gave the command, and, if that remedy is considered inadequate, provision may be made for a claim against the state
which assumed the selection of the offending superior. To say that
the military would usurp powers not intended for it if the soldier
were given this absolute immunity is both unfair and unreasonable.
Does the judiciary, because of its immunity for certain acts which
may be injurious to the rights of others, wilfully proceed to commit
those acts?
Thus far, however, the courts appear to have been over-zealous
in their efforts to keep the military in strict subordination to the
civil authority. Until this pronounced zeal for the supremacy of the
civil authority over a most important executive of the government
abates, and the harshness and inconsistency of the law on this question
as it now stands, are properly appreciated, the soldier or militiaman
in those states where the law has not been changed by legislative
enactment must continue to act at his peril in obeying the orders of
his erring superior, and trust to a possible indemnity from a benevolent
5
legislature, or a pardon from a sympathetic pardoning power.

Likewise another writer has argued that members of
the armed forces should feel assured that the law will protect them in the proper discharge of their orders. Military
officers, he suggests, should not be responsible for acts done
in obedience to commands of superior officers of their government, unless such commands are manifestly illegal. This
he calls the majority view, and says that there is a respectable minority which favors the "absolute non-liability of an
4. O'Brien, Military Law pp. 26 and 27.
5. Aclerly, Legal Responsibility of Obedient Soldier or Militiaman,
(1916) 22 Case and Com. 739.

THE TORT LIABILITY OF A SOLDIER

officer or soldier when he acts without oppression and without personal malice."6
A similar position is expressed in Bangar's Law of Riot
Dity, wherein the author says:
Order being relied upon, under the foregoing rule the only
liability which the officer may incur, is in the exec,.ion of these
orders. In such execution he is safe if he acts with iltent to obey
the order, and not from recklessness, or love of power, or to gratify
any bad passion. Therefore, as a general rule, if an officer acts
soley with intent to obey his orders he is not respon3ible for the
consequences.
When troops are called into the military service in time of
war, by enlistment or by draft, they should clearly understand that
obedience is their first duty. The first word is discipline, and
there is no second. . . . Instill into the mind of a recruit a doubt

with respect to his duty to obey his officers, and a long ntep has been
taken toward destroying the morale of the organization.7

The argument goes a long way toward refuting the so-called
general "American Rule."
Bearing in mind, then, that there is a conflict of opinion
as to the extent of the rule governing a soldier's civil liability,
let us examine the three situations to which the rule is applicable.
I

In Combat or under Conditions of War
The common law recognized the authority of the military and naval forces to make such invasions of the interests of individual civilians as were reasonably necessary to
prevent an invasion of the enemy; to successfully prosecute
the war; or to prevent property of military value from falling into the hands of the enemy. 8
In other words, the law is clear that on the field of
battle or in the direct conduct of the war itself, a soldier
can absolve himself from civil liability for his acts by showing that he was acting in obedience to the command of
6. Turney, Civil and Criminal Accountability of Member of the
Army and Navy, (1917) 24 Case and Com. 297.
7. Bangar, Law of Riot Duty p. 254.
8. Ford v Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 24 L. ed. 1018 (1877); Koonce v
Davis, 72 N.C. 218 (1875); Thomasson v Glisson, 4 Heisk (51
Tenn.) 615 (1871); Stafford v Mercer, 42 Ga. 556 (1871);
Harper, The Law of Torts (1933) j 59, p. 317.
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his superior officer.- In the case of Trammell v. Bassett 0
the defendants, Confederate soldiers, acted under the orders of their captain, seized property belonging to the plaintiff. A state of war existed at the time, and the seizure
amounted to a legitimate military objective. The defendants plead as their defense the orders of their superior.
The court said:
We think it may be laid down, as a well settled proposition,
that obedience is the first duty of a soldier. It is not for him
to ask the reason for the order he receives, or the act he is to do,
or to consider the consequences of the act. *** He must obey. To
him the maxim of despotism, that "to hear is to obey" is more nearly
applicable than to any other class of society. If such be the rule
applicable to the private soldier, he should certainly be permitted
to prove it in his justification.
The defendants are not themselves responsible for their actions
so performed, and the plaintiff must rely on his action against the
officer giving the order. If it can be proved that said officer abused
his discretion or acted in a manner which military necessity did not

require, then he would be liable to the plaintiff in damages which
grew out of such unwarranted exercise of authority."

The doctrine of this case must be qualified, however,
by Mitchell v. Harmony.12 Mitchell, an army officer, was
sued in an action of trespass by Harmony for seizing his
property in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. The defendant contends that the United States was at war with Mexico,
and that he was justified in taking the property by virtue
of an order from his commanding officer. He also justifies
the taking under his own authority as an officer. Concerning his suspicion that Harmony intended to engage in trading with the enemy, Mr. Chief Justice Haney, in holding
for the plaintiff, said:
Mere suspicions of an illegal intention will not justify a military
officer to seize or detain the property of an AmericaA citizen.
9.

Birkhimer, Military Government p. 448.

10. 24 Ark. 499 (1866).
11. Accord, Bell v L. & N. R. Co., 1 Bush (Ky.) 404, 89 Am. Dec. 636
(1866), wherein the court held in favor of the defendant, Bell,
saying that the destruction of a railroad locomotive and cars
under orders of Confederate

General, Morgan, was a lawful

exercise of a belligerent right, because that road was used to a
great extent in supplying the Union Army; Taylor v Jenkins,

24 Ark. 337 (1866); Ford v Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878); but cf.
Christian County Ct. v Rankin and Tharp, 2 Duv. (Ky.)

(1866); Terril v Rankin, 2 Bush (Ky.) 453 (1867).
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Where the owner has done nothing to forfeit his rights, every
public officer is bound to respect them, whether he finds the property
in foreign or hostile country or in his own.
The question here is, whether the law permits it (property)
to be taken to insure the success of any enterprise against a public
enemy which the commanding officer may deem it advisable to undertake. And we think it very clear that the law does not permit it. 13

In accord with the moderate views of Chief Justice
Taney, the Supreme Court of Tennessee decided the case of
Yost

V.

Stoult, 14 some sixteen years later.

It

involved an

action to recover the value of a wagon and mules taken by
Confederate soldiers from one Stout, who was a non-belligerent farmer.
In discussing the rights of a soldier during combat or
impending combat to seize the property of civilians the
court said:
"An officer has no right to impress private property unless
forced by inevitable necessity; and an order by his sup 3rior officer,
unless such necessity exists, is no protection to him.
"There are without doubt occasions in which private property
may be lawfully taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from
falling into the hands of the public enemy; and also whEn a military
officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress private property
into the public service, or take it for public use. Uriquestionably,
in such cases, the government is bound to make full compensation to
the owner, and the officer is not a trespasser. But we are clearly
of the opinion that in all these cases the danger must be immediate
and impending, or the necessity urgent for the public service, and
such as will not admit of delay; and when the action of the civil
authority would be too late in providing the means which the occasion
called for.
"It is impossible to define the dangers or necessities in which
this power may be lawfully exercised; every case must depend on its
own circumstances; it is the emergency that gives the right, and the
emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.
An officer has no right to take the private property of any
individual not in arms to insure the success of any enterprise against
the public enemy, which he may deem it advisable to undertake, where
the owner has done nothing to forfeit his rights."
12.
13.

13 How. 115 (U.S. 1851).
Accord, Mostyn v Fabrigas, 1 Cowper 161, 98 Eng. Rep. (K.B.)
1021 (1774), wherein Lord Mansfield expresses the English views;
Hough v Hoodless, 35 Ill. 166 (1864); Moran v Smell, 5 W. Va.
26 (1871); Farmer v Ldwis, 1 Bush (Ky.) 66, 89 Am. Dec. 610
(1866); Bryan v Walker, 64 N.C. 141 (1870); Dills v Hatcher,
6 Bush (Ky.) 606 (1866); but cf 2 Hare, American Constitutional Law (1889) pp. 918 and 919.
14. 4 Coldwell (Tenn.) 205, 94 Am. Dec. 194 (1867).
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This case is in accord with Mitchell v. Harmony; and,
even though it was later overruled on another point, it contains a sound statement of the law. 15
However, the rule that a soldier may not take the private property of a civilian merely to "insure the success of
any enterprise against the public enemy" should be carefully scrutinized, for as the court said in Taylor v. Nashville
and C. R. R. Co. :16
"The necessity which justifies the taking (of private property
by military officers and men) 1" in such a case is not that over-

powering necessity which admits of no supposable alternative; but if
the vast interests at stake may probably be promoted by the appropriation of the property, it is the right and duty of the officers, on

whom rest the obligation, to omit no useful precaution-to take and
appropriate it."

Bearing in mind the modern interpretation of "necessity," it seems fair to summarize the tort liability of a soldier of subordinate officer while in combat or on similar
operations by saying that he may be absolved from liability
for executing an order which it was illegal or perhaps even
criminal to give.
The question really amounts to this: "Did the soldier
have reasonable cause for believing that what he was commanded to do was a military necessity?" In determining
this point, the soldier obviously must take into consideration
that the person in command is better able to judge the
situation and is better informed concerning the problem.
If, after weighing these circumstances, he believes that the
command is justifiable, he should not be held responsible for
declining to decide that the order was wrong. He should
not be held civilly liable for obeying the military command.
II
During Peacetime or During Non-Combat Operations
The greater portion of a soldier's military career, as
we know, is spent in training, in conducting combat prob15. Accord, Jones v Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.) 34, 89 Am. Dec.

16.
17.

605 (1866); Merritt v Mayor of Nashville, 5 Cold. 95 (1867);
Bland v Adams Express, 1 Duv. (S.C.) 232, 85 Am. Dec. 623
(1864); Smith v Brazelton, 1 Heisk (S.C.) 44, 2 Am. Rep. 678
(1870); Price v Poynter, 1 Bush (Ky.) 387, 89 Am. Dec. 631
(1867).
6 Coldwell (Tenn.) 646, 66 Am. Dec. 474 (1869).
Parentheses mine.
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lems, in maneuvers, and in just living in and near an army
camp. Under these circumstances his liability to civilians
is quite different from his liability while in combat. Hs
status is almost the same as that of a civilian.
In the leading case of Bates v. Clark,18 Mr. Justice Miller said:
Whatever may be the rule in time of war and in the presence
of actual hostilities, military officers can no more protect themselves
than civilians in time of peace by orders emanating from a source
which is itself without authority. 19

Similarly, in the recent case of Armstrong v. Sengo,20
the California District Court of Appeals, said:
In time of peace the military power is subordinate to civil law,
(Article 1, section 12, Constitution of California), and in time of
peace it is no defense to a suit for damages resulting from a wilful
or negligent act that it was performed in obedience to Ile unlawful
command of a superior officer of a company belonging to the National
Guard, when that order is known to the militiaman, or, by the exercise
of reasonable care, should have been known to him to be unlawful.21

In the case of Bishop v. Vandercook 22 the governor of
Michigan, at the request of the authorities of Monroe County,
ordered out a part of the state militia to assist said county's
officials in preventing the transportation of liquor from Ohio
into the county, 'though martial law was not declared.'
Col. Vandercook, one of the defendants, was put in command, and he ordered a log thrown across the road to stop
all travelers who refused to stop upon orders of ,,tate troopers further up the road. Plaintiff, a cab driver, suffered
personal injury and damage to his taxicab when his car was
ditched as a result of his hitting the log. The Supreme
Court of Michigan, in affirming a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, said:
"The power of the military in time of peace has been fixed
beyond cavil as being no more than an aid to civil authorities in
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

95 U.S. 204 (1877).
Cf. McCall v McDowell, 1 Abb. 212 (U.S. 1867), 15 Fed. Cas. 1235,
discussed infra, wherein the court, in a similar set of circumstances arising under martial law, held an illegal order to be an
excuse.
17 Calif. (2d) 300, 61 P. (2d) 1188 (1936).
Accord, Clay v United States, Dev. Ct. Cl. 25, Reoorts, Vol. 1
(1855-1856) 21 (1856).
228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924).
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executing the law. It is so declared by the Constitution of this
state, and was so fixed to ward off the evils of military rule so
often recorded in early English history. . . . If the civil power,
in order to successfully cope with lawlessness, needs the aid of
military power, the need may be met and the aid extended; but it is
at all times by way of aid to the civil power and cannot authorize
the exercise of independent military power ...
"No sheriff should undertake to hold up travel over the public
highway and halt travelers for inquisition and search and exact
peril of life or limb for refusal to submit. No such power is vested
in that office. If the power cannot be found in that office of sheriff,
it certainly cannot exist in any aid called to his assistance."

Thus, during peacetime, or even during war in an area
not at the time directly affected by conditions of battle,
or under martial law, a soldier's liability to civilians is similar to that of a peace officer acting in a similar situation.
He must confine his activities to those of a regular lawenforcing officer. If the order under which he acts and
which he attempts to set up as a justification for his actions
was issued without authority, or was illegal in any way,
the soldier's liability is unquestionably the same as if he'd
been "wearing the blue of the police force rather than the
olive-drab of the army."
Although the extent of a soldier's tort liability for illegal acts done under orders while the army is conducting
maneuvers has not been the subject of judicial decision, it
would appear that civil courts would be unwilling to grant
supremacy to the military unless such is absolutely necessary,
and secondly, that, during maneuvers, conditions in the area
are still those of a nation at peace. The army is merely indulging in a game-a serious game to be sure-but one
which should not be allowed to deprive civilians of their
customary and firmly established civil rights.
III
During Insurrection-UnderMartial Law
There are times when a country is neither at war nor
at peace; times when the land is in a state of insurrection,
chaos, or mob rebellion; times when martial law must prevail.
Under the general rule which certainly must be qualified,
any occurrence of hostilities during an insurrection or rebellion does not vary the position of a citizen, or deprive
him of the protection of the common law. For any injury
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or violence inflicted upon him under color of military authority, he may still seek redress from the civil tribunals :23
"The declaration of martial law by the chief execative of the
state or nation does not alter the rules of civil liability except
in so far as such declaration indicates the emergency ard the necessity for the use of force to preserve order."24

The question of a soldier's civil liability, when acting
during the existence of martial law, was exter,sively discussed in two articles dealing with "The Case of Private
Wadsworth.'2 :5
These articles were prompted by the anthracite coal strikes, and an accompanying declaration of

martial law in Pennsylvania, which, in turn, produced the
26
case of Commonwealth ex rel Wadsworth v. Shortall.
summarizing the situation the author said:

In

"The civil cases, then, with one exception, lay down the rule
that a soldier cannot justify an unlawful act by the Ilea that he
committed it under orders. Two cases qualify this rule, the one by
saying that if the orders are within the scope of the officer's authority they constitute a justification; the other by saying that unless the order is obviously and palpably illegal, it is a justification."

The rule needs further qualification.

The American

decisions tend to fall into three general classes.
In the case of McCall v. McDowell27 the plaintiff sued
General McDowell to recover damages for false imprisonment and injuries attendant thereto. After the as.mssination
of President Lincoln, the Military Department in and around
San Francisco was confronted with the problem of a minor
insurrection. Sympathizers of Lincoln and the Union cause

were destroying property of all known sympathizers of the

Confederacy.
To cope with this situation General

McDowell-com-

manding general of the Department of the Paci ic-issued
an order in which he called such people who rejoiced in
Lincoln's assassination "accessories after the fact" and ordered their arrest by the Provost Marshal. In accord with

this order, Captain Douglas arrested McCall, who had been
23.
24.
25.

Tyler v Pomeroy, 8 Allen (Mass.) 480 (1864).
Harper, The Law of Torts (1933) § 59, p. 136.
See The Case of Private Wadsworth (1905) 51 Am. L. Reg. (42
N.S.) 161.
26. 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903).
27. 1 Abb. 212 (U.S. 1867), Dir. Ct., Dist. of Calif., 15 Fed. Cas. 1235.
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known to say harsh, unpleasant things about the martyred
President.
The court, while holding McDowell liable because he
was not authorized or commanded to issue such an order,
and had abused his discretionary power, said by way of
dicta:
Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first
blush it is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding
that the order is illegal, I cannot but think that the law should
excuse the military subordinate when acting in obedience to the
orders of his commander. Otherwise he is placed in the dangerous
dilemma of being liable in damages to third persons for obedience
to an order, or to the loss of his commission and disgrace for disobedience thereto. *** The first duty of a soldier is obedience; and
without this there can be neither discipline nor efficiency in an
army. If every subordinate officer and soldier were at liberty to
question the legality of the orders of the commander, and obey them
or not, as they may consider them valid or invalid, the camp would
be turned into a debating school, where the precious moment for
action would be wasted in wordy conflicts between the advocates
of conflicting opinions. . . . Nor is it necessary to the ends of
justice that the subordinate or soldier should be responsible for,
obedience to the illegal order of a superior. . . . The certain
vexation and annoyance together with the risk of professional disgrace
and punishment which usually attend the disobedience of orders by
an inferior, may safely be deemed sufficient to constrain his judgment and action, and to excuse him for yielding obedience to those
upon whom the law has devolved both the duty and responsibility of
controlling his conduct in the premises. *** To so protect the soldier
would not leave the injured individual without remedy, for he would
still have his right of action against the officer who gave the illegal
order; and if such remedy was inadequate, provision might be made
for a claim against the state, which assumed the selection of the
offending superior. Such a rule would put the responsibility where
it rightfully belongs.

In Commonwealth ex rel Wadsworth v. Shortall 28 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressed a similar view.
The court said:
The effect of martial law is to put into operation the powers
and methods vested in the commanding officer by military law. ***
The situation of troops in a riotous and insurrectionary district
approximates that of troops in a enemy's country, and in proportion to
the extent and violence of the overt acts of hostility shown, is the
degree of severity justified in the means of repression. The re.
quirements of the situation in either case, therefore, shift with the
28.

206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903).
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circumstances, and the same standard of justification must apply
9
to both.2

In Franks v. Smith30 the defendant was ordered by his
commanding officer to stop all people passing along the
highway in groups of more than two and search them and
if they were found carrying weapons, to arrest them. Franks
arrested Smith, who brings this action to recover damages
for his false arrest. All of the defendant's actions were
carried out under orders, and it appears that he did not in
any material way abuse the authority given him. The court,
in holding for the plaintiff said:
Conduct like this is such an intolerable invasion of private
rights, and so at war with the principles set forth in the Bill of
Rights, that "the people shall be secure in their perion, houses,
papers, and possessions from unreasonable search and seizure" (Section
10), that we cannot consent that all military orders, however reasonable
they may appear, will afford protection in the civil or criminal courts
of the state. *** Any military order, whether it be given by the governor of the state, or an officer of the militia, or a civil officer of a
city or county, that attempts to invest either officer or private with
authority in excess of that which may be exercised by pEace officers
of the state, is unreasonable and unlawful; . . . The only difference
between our ruling and that obtaining in the authorities cited is that
we define more precisely than they do what orders a soldier is justified
in executing, and hold as a matter of law that these orders are
confined to such as a peace officer, in the discharge of his duty,
might execute. *** the soldier has the same measure o22 protection
and is subject to the same liability, whether he is acting under the
orders of a military officer, independent of the local civil authorities,
or is acting under immediate direction of these authorities.

These are the two extremes. On one hand is the view
favoring the soldier; on the other the view favoring the
civilian. It seems impossible to reconcile these two positions.
What can the soldier do to save himself from punishment for
refusing to obey the command of his superior officer? Or,
should he choose to obey, what can he do to save himself
from liability in civil proceedings brought by the person
aggrieved?
3
This embarassing dilemma is well put by Dicey : 1
29.
30.
31.

Accord, Stoughton v Dimick; 3 Blatchf., 356, Cir. Ct., Dist. of Vt.,
23 Fed. Cas. 177 (1855); but cf. the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Taney, in Luther v Borden, 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849).
142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911).
A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (3rd ed. 1889) p. 281.
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A soldier is bound to obey any lawful order which he receives
from his military superior. But a soldier cannot any more than any
civilian avoid responsibility for breach of the law by pleading that
he broke the law in bona fide obedience to orders of the commander
in chief. Hence, the position of a soldier may be both in theory and
in practice a difficult one. He may, as it has been said, be liable
to be shot by a court martial for disobedience of order, or to be
hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it. . . . What is, from a
legal point of view, the duty of a soldier? The matter is one which
has never been absolutely decided. The following answer given by
Mr. Justice Stephen is, it may be fairly assumed, as nearly correct
a reply as the state of the authorities make it possible to provide:
"The only line that presents itself to my mind is that a soldier
should be protected by orders for which he might reasonably believe
his officer to have good grounds for giving. The inconvenience of
being subject to two jurisdictions, the sympathies of which are not
unlikely to be opposed to each other, is an inevitable consequence
of a double necessity of preserving on the one hand, the supremacy
of the law, and, on the other, the discipline of the army."

The Supreme Court of Montana in Herlihy v. Donohue et
al. 32 has gone far to resolve the conflict. A Major Donohue,
commander of the organized militia, acting under a declaration of martial law, issued an order closing all saloons between the hours 7 p.m. and 8 a.m. The plaintiff violated
this order and Donohue and his subordinate officers destroyed
his stock of liquor. The court said:
An army without discipline is a mob. The highest duty of a
soldier is to obey, for upon obedience all discipline must depend.
Necessity is the foundation for organized military forces, and to
the extent that necessity requires it, obedience to orders is demanded.
But necessity can never require obedience to an order manifestly
illegal or beyond the authority of the superior to give, and therefore
reason and common sense seem to justify the rule that the inferior
military officer may defend his act against civil liability by reference to the order of his superior, unless such order bears upon
its face the marks of its own invalidity or want of authority. If
the order is one which the superior might lawfully make, the inferior
cannot refuse obedience until he shall have investigated the surrounding circumstances and determined for himself that they justify the
order in the particular instance. If, on the other hand, the order
is so palpably illegal or without authority that any reasonably prudent
man ought to recognize the fact, obedience thereto furnishes no excuse
for a wrongful act, even though disobedience may subject the offender
to punishment at the hands of a military tribusal.

This opinion steers a middle course between the tyrannical rule of the McCall case, the rule Chief Justice Taney
32.

52 Mont. 601, 161 P. 164 (1916).
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feared when he wrote Luther v. Borden,33 and the unworkable rule of Franks v. Smith. By modifying one clause in
the Montana opinion, namely, "If the order is one which
the superior might lawfully make," so that it would read,
"
.
which a reasonably prudent inferior in the light
of the circumstances might believe the superior could lawfully make," the rule would achieve results as fair as could
be expected under the circumstances. Such a modification
would insure that the soldier would continue to be mindful
of the fact that his superior might be issuing an unlawful
order, but would still relieve him of legal responsibility for
acting under orders which, though they appea-red lawful,
actually were illegal.
In all situations, however, the soldier may not use more
force than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which
he was ordered to act. All the rules, including that in the
Montana case, presuppose this fact, and, should he exercise
the power given him for the purpose of oppressioni, or if any
injury is wilfully done by him, he will inevitably be answerable therefor. 34 Likewise, in determining a soldier's tort
liability in any situation, it is essential to consider the statutes. Several of the states as well as Congress have exempted members of the armed forces from certain types of
civil liability.3 5 But even with these protections, the conflict between military discipline and civil responsibility will
still leave the soldier's lot "not a happy one."
33.
34.
35.

7 How. I (U.S. 1849).
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